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This paper is both more theoretical and highly applied; both 
methodological and policy-oriented. Empirically until recently there has 
been little work on momentum effects. By way of case-studies on 
momentum effects, the paper reviews published policy-oriented work on 
New Zealand on national growth and age-structural transitions; on 
fertility patterns in New Zealand; and on survivorship and longevity, and 
the more local discussion of Maori-Pakeha differentials.  The conclusion is 
that more attention must be paid to momentum. It calls for the 
demographic community to lead in moving policy analyses away from 




Stories that Demography Tells 
 
Demography deals with the most central and intimate parts of the human 
experience: sex, conception and birth, socialization, marriage and family, 
work and changing places, and, finally, death, whether this occurs in bed or 
is due to violence, the external causes as violence is so cutely called. This is 
inherently interesting for it is the stuff of Soap Opera, but by presenting this 
in a very technical way some in our community manage successfully to make 
demography’s soap opera boring. 
 So what, then, could be more exciting than the subject of my paper, 
momentum? I can see you waiting in anticipation as the very word grabs 
you and sends chills up and down your spine.  But perhaps instead, you are 
wondering what in the heck is momentum, and what on earth has it got to 
do with all those saucy, vital subjects that I have just outlined. Well rather a 
lot as it happens, but in discussing this we have to go back to technical 
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demography and even further back than that into theoretical mathematical 
demography.  
 Before I do so I have a few other introductory comments. Beyond 
covering the sauciest aspects of life, demography deals with phenomena that 
have another appealing feature, in this case, however, statistically appealing. 
It is a truism, but one that certainly makes the life of the analyst, 
particularly the modeler, somewhat easier, that many demographic factors 
follow highly deterministic trajectories over time. No matter how hard you 
try as a parent you cannot have birth two before birth one; you cannot get 
divorced before you get married, or leave a job before you start it. The most 
deterministic paths are followed by birth and death, of course, while labour 
force participation, migration and nuptiality all involve comings and goings, 
traced by movement through multi-state models. 
 To add to this, some key demographic variables are self-defined. Not 
only that but they mean the same in most languages. For example, look up 
the definition of live-birth or of death in the United Nations Multi-lingual 
Demographic Dictionary. Of course, statistical precision may not accord with 
social construction: in Ghana, the infant out-dooring ceremony at about 
seven days -- that is when the child has survived the highest risk neonatal 
period -- is an example of the difference between statistical purity and social 
usage. Moreover, a false sense of precision may be imposed on some data 
collection processes: registered marriage is extremely neat and precise, but 
was imposed on existing Maori customary marriage patterns, and even the 
conjugal patterns of some Pakeha. Whether census-based or survey-based, 
labour force statistics are full of false precisions: unemployment rates, hours 
worked or income to take three examples. The rule is that the further you 
go from the certainties of birth or death, or perhaps crossing a border, the 
less precise become the definitional tools.  
 Another endearing feature of demographic change is that it is often 
inexorable, and this is the fact that underpins analyses of momentum. Once 
you are born into a cohort only “death may do you part”, to misquote the 
Anglican marriage ceremony. In this day and age you can report your 
ethnicity in different ways at different times; you can seek an operation to 
change your gender; but you can never leave the cohort into which you are 
born. We have you in our clutches!  
 Unless a population is exposed to extremely high levels of migration, 
moreover, cohort size is set down at birth – even in New Zealand cohort size 
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changes due to migration are at the margins of significance. Old age and 
death of course eventually wipe the cohort out – inexorability could be 
avoided only if oldies were popped out on ice-flows, or if some highly-age 
specific calamitous epidemic were to occur. 
 In this paper I want to look firstly at the theoretical underpinnings of 
the analysis of momentum, and along with this cohort studies, for 
momentum is primarily a phenomenon that occurs to cohorts. Then to 
illustrate this I want to take some case studies relating to some substantive 




Let’s start by going back momentarily to the 17th century, to the Royal 
Society of London, to the discipline they called “political arithmetick”, and to 
the days of the founders of demography, people like Graunt or Halley -- the 
latter of whom, as we well know, also moonlighted a bit as  an astronomer. 
Their life-table work laid down the importance of the cohort as a unit of 
analysis, and inherent in that was the notion of momentum. I also note this 
because demography is a very old academic discipline, not some Johnny 
come lately – most social sciences date from the breakup of philosophy and 
theology in the 19th century whereas demography dates from the 17th 
Century. From those days down to the present mathematical demography 
has contributed  enormously to our field in three major ways. 
 Firstly, it has established the rules about commonalities in human 
behaviour, especially on the bio-social side: how we survive parturition and 
infancy, when we become parents, and when we die. It has been very 
successful in this, developing its own corpus of theory. On the more social 
demographic side of course it must draw on theory from across the social 
and medical sciences. 
 Secondly, mathematical demography helps us establish rules about 
populations as collectivities, and this will be the area of focus of my paper. 
This part of mathematical demography, reflected for example in stable 
theory, has evolved far from its common origins with biometric and 
actuarial theory. Through elaborate explorations around the conditions of 
quasi-stability, and a huge volume of empirical studies across almost every 
population on the planet, mathematical demography has developed the tools 
that have allowed demographer-practitioners across the Third World to 
apply models drawn from stable theory in order to estimate vital rates in the 
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absence of adequate registration data. In historical demography we often do 
the same thing.  
 Two closely interrelated phenomena about collectivities, coming down 
to us from the founders of the discipline, are central to this paper: cohorts, 
and momentum. A true cohort is followed over time and relates to an entity 
with a common statistical quality at a common starting point, normally 
birth (OED, New Shorter 1993). The members of the cohort are identified by 
this as they are followed over time either to death, or to some other so-
called “death state” when they leave the status on which the research is 
focused. For mortality studies this would normally be at death per se; in 
fertility studies it could be menopause; in labour studies it could be 
retirement. The term cohort as adopted, say, by bio-medical science and 
economics really relates to a panel of individuals followed over a short 
period of time, say five years, although the Christchurch and Dunedin 
longitudinal panel studies and a few of their ilk stand apart as they have 
been running a very long time.  
 Surveys such as the NZW:FEE (1995) collect such data retrospectively 
on individuals, a sort of retrospective panel. They have disadvantages 
because they depend on recall, the quality of which varies between different 
variables; but they have distinct advantages relating to cost, to avoidance of 
loss to follow-up problems and because they can cover a much wider range 
of real cohorts over very long time spans. In the NZW:FEE we have data on 
women born between 1936 and 1975.  
 The great value of a population cohort study, as against a panel study, is 
that the size of the unit being studied, and its current needs and impacts are 
a function of the events and experiences they have been exposed to earlier in 
life, and about which, if one is fortunate, there are data, both on members of 
the cohort themselves, or on co-variates. In this regard the experiences of a 
cohort should be seen as an analogue of the sorts of experiences to which 
individuals in a panel study might be exposed. I return to this point later as 
it is extremely important, as, for example, when we come to the study of 
population mortality as against individual mortality. 
 Momentum is most easily conceptualised as a demographic behavioural 
pattern followed by cohorts: most commonly it is the impetus built up by a 
cohort for some phenomenon. This allows one to study purely demographic 
impacts on the population (eg. age-momentum as analysed by Rowland1996; 
or deterioration in cohort survival, as studied by Bourbeau and Legare 1981, 
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on Norway). By following the momentum built up by cohorts it also is 
possible to look at the effects of non-demographic factors. The actuary 
Willets has argued that in health, for example, “the experience of different 
generations – before birth, in childhood and in adulthood – is a powerful 
determinant of experience in later life and has predictive possibilities” 
(Willets 2004:39). Norman Ryder (1965) took this further by looking at 
social applications of cohort analysis. 
 If we turn to the literature there are precious few studies on momentum. 
Most outstanding was that of leading methodologists, Andrei Rogers and J 
Woodward, who were looking at “ageing in place” as against inflows of 
migrating retirees (1988). Their conclusion was that momentum was a 
major factor in the growth of elderly populations in the United States except 
in those regions that were significant retirement zones. Rowland (1996) has 
applied the concept to national ageing. 
 The third contribution of mathematical demography is that it has taken 
its knowledge of population behaviour and translated this across to applied 
areas and developed measuring tools. These relate firstly to statistical 
reporting per se: that is, to  the conventional techniques of demography that 
typically come down to us from Farr, who was also a founding father of 
epidemiology; to the intrinsic indices; and to the non-conventional indirect 
estimation techniques that are most commonly based on stable population 
theory. But secondly the development of these tools also relate to their 
application to interpretations. For the major demographic variables there 
are thus real international benchmarks against which trends in New Zealand 
can be compared. We really do know what is a very high birth rate, or a 
high growth rate, and whatever. In part this is a result of the availability of 
data collected in standardized ways, with built-in quality controls, covering 
a very wide range of historical, even paleo-historical, and contemporary 
populations. 
 
Some Case Studies 
 
In an earlier national-level paper on New Zealand I showed how the 
inexorable forces of momentum were derived essentially from birth cohort 
sizes. In New Zealand’s case, by comparison with most other Western 
Developed Countries, because birth cohort sizes have varied very 
significantly momenta produce highly disordered cohort flows – more 
severe disorder is observed in some former Soviet bloc countries, notably 
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Russia and Romania. Momentum in general has major implications for all 
social and economic development, whether in the market or the policy 
sectors; when it is disordered, as in New Zealand’s case, this makes policy 
and market analysis even more complex (Pool 2003).  
 The differing patterns of momentum and associated age-structural 
transitions have come under the spotlight internationally over the last few 
years (Tuljapurkar et al. 2005; Pool 2005; Pool et al. in press). The resultant 
literature shows that ageing is only one aspect of age-structural transition, 
and that it is at the end of such transitions, a relatively long way off in New 
Zealand’s case. But before this disordered cohort flows will pass across the 
age-pyramid, and this is the key factor of population and development in 
many countries, including New Zealand. In some countries, and New 
Zealand is a good example, when ageing does occur, momentum effects 
assure that disordered cohort flows occur at old ages, producing fluctuations 
between when the elderly population is weighted towards the younger 
elderly and when it is dominated by the older elderly (Pool 2003). This is 
the context for what we are observing in New Zealand.    
 But let us move beyond national populations. Let us see the effects on 
particular demographic factors: the sex ratio, mortality, fertility. 
 
Sex Ratio at 30-34 Years 
 
When I was a member of the cast of a student revue back in the 1950s we 
had  a song about “Sweet Little Fresherettes, sheltered from all forms of 
vice…”. It ended “They’ll just have to save their tender young hearts to the 
next boat of immigrants lands”, the implications being this is how a shortfall 
of men would be made up. Of course, in those days the immigrants were 
often likely to be young British or Dutch males, rather than Asian females. I 
was reminded of this when I read all sorts of articles in the weekend papers 
about the sex ratio at, for example, 30-34 years. The conclusion seemed to 
be that the imbalance should be blamed on migrants, in this case Asian 
women migrants. Migrants have always been the scapegoats for all our ills, 
yet paradoxically they are also seen as the saviours of our economy. So I 
asked myself, were they being unfairly blamed, was that the only or real 
explanation for the shortage of men, or conversely the excess of women at 
these ages?  A cross-sectional analysis might suggest this, but would taking 
a cohort momentum view suggest alternative explanations that would 
require the question to be asked again? 
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 Let’s look by gender and ethnicity at the history of the people aged 30-
34 years in 2001, who were born in 1966-71. Data on them are presented in 
Table 1.  In reviewing these data, for Non Maori most loss is by attrition, 
death or migration, and at these ages mortality will be a very minor factor. 
For Maori there is the added problem of inter-ethnic mobility. We can 
overcome this factor by citing figures for the total population. That said, 
buttressed by the sure knowledge that the Maori figures are not affected to 
any degree by Asian migration, or indeed by any other inflows except those 
of returning New Zealanders, the Maori data give us an idea of what would 
have happened to Pakeha if it had approximated a semi-closed population, or 
of what would have happened to Pakeha if replacement migration had not 
occurred. What shows up is that, not having compensating flows, Maori sex 
ratios are heavily affected by emigration; for Pakeha the effect is muted by 
gender differentials in inflows from other sources that are not composed of 
returning New Zealander. 
 We can look only at net effects – we do not know the composition of the 
various inflows and outflows. Nevertheless, the results are fascinating. Sex 
ratio changes are miniscule until 1986. Assuming that change in cohort size 
comes overwhelmingly from migration, then first emigration and then 
immigration play a role in shaping the sex ratio. It is the massive outflows 
of both sexes, but particularly males, in the periods of restructuring, and to a 
lesser degree the late 1990s that are the prime cause of the male deficit, or 
the surplus of females. This has been but partly compensated by inflows 
recently of non Maori females.  For women, there is actually a net outflow 
over the period 1986 to 2001. A total of 13,800 went and 13,713 arrived. But 
for men the net figure was far higher: the net outflow was 22,623 but they 
were replaced by a mere 1,893 net inflow. 
 In sum a cohort analysis confirms that Asian migration may have played 
a role in distorting the sex-ratio. But its role was merely to counterbalance 
huge outflows of the resident population. And in this it was far from 
successful – barely so for females, not at all for males. If there is culpability 
for the deficit of males it rests more with radical restructuring either side of 
1990 than with Asian females. 
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Table One:  New Zealand Cohort Born 1966-71, Maori and Non-Maori 
by Gender 
 
Date Age Maori  Non-Maori 
  Males Females Males Females 
1971  0-4 ** ** 132,424 127,036 
1976  5-9 ** ** 138,414 132,355 
1981  10-14 27,561 26,865 128,289 122,637 
1986  15-19 24,847 24,555 128,061 122,613 
1991  20-24 20,796 22,059 115,182 113,058 
Difference 86-91  -4,071 -2,496 -12,879 -12,879 
1996  25-29 20,343 22,809 112,110 118-041 
Difference 91-96  -453 +750 -3,072 +4,983 
2001  30-34 18,195 21,060 114,003 126,021 
Difference 96-01  -2,148 -1,749 +1,893 +7,980 
 
Sex Ratios 
1971  0-4  ** 104  
1976  5-9  ** 105 
1981  10-14 103 105 
1986  15-19 101 104 
1991  20-24   94 102 
1996  25-29   89   95 
2001  30-34   86   90 
 
Interpretation 
1971-76:  Approximates normal sex ratio at birth. Non Maori of both genders grow pro 
rata through passive migration. 
1976-81:  Non Maori of both genders decrease pro rata by passive emigration. 
1981-86:  Nothing very much happens. 
1986-91:  An interesting control is that by definition Maori are not Non-Maori and few 
Asians are counted as Maori. Net loss of Maori males of 1,575. Net loss  of Non 
Maori males of 3,324. Loss of all males of 4,899.  
1991-96:  Loss of a further 3525 males, but offset by a gain of 5,733 females. Of these, 
though, 750 (13 per cent) Maori, and assuming that that is some indication of a 
return migration, not all of the 4,983 would have been Asian. 
1996-2001: Loss of large numbers of Maori, and a net loss of a further 255 males. Gain of  
6,231 females. Gain of 1,893 Non Maori males none of whom, by definition, could 
have been Asian females. 
 
Restructuring (1986-1991) drove 16,950 males of this cohort out of New Zealand, plus 12,051 
females, a surplus of 4,899 males. Changes in the early 1990s drove out a further 3,525 males, 
recalling that this was also the era in which both Asian males and females arrived. This was 
counterbalanced by the inflow of Maori and Non Maori women. Even at the end of the 1990s 
there was a net loss of males, driven by Maori trends. 
 
Thus restructuring pushed out 20,475 men from this cohort, and the late 1990s saw another 
2,148 go, a total loss, mainly in the period 1986-96 of 22,623, replaced by 1,893 men. 
 
Restructuring also drove out 12,051 women, and another 1,749 went at the end of the 1990s, 
a total of 13,800, who were replaced by 13,713 immigrants or returning New Zealanders. 
 
In sum, for the production of the imbalanced sex ratio top marks go to the outflows 
accompanying radical restructuring, and only a very distant second rank to an inflow of 
young women, Asian or other. 
 
**   The definitional changes in the 1970s produce inexplicable shifts in the size of this 
Maori cohort, whereas from 1981 the baseline seems to carry across to other censuses 
and the changes are much more explicable. 
DEMOGRAPHY’S MISSING LINK 9 
Cohort Effects in Mortality 
 
In a paper that Jit Cheung and I have in the press (in Genus) at present we 
looked at Pakeha patterns of mortality around the dawn of the 20th century.  
In a paper published in the New Zealand Population Review we extended this 
analysis to the early 21st century for both Maori and Pakeha.  The results 
were very interesting in both instances. As they are published there is no 
need to document them here. The analysis can be divided into two: the 
earlier period and the more recent.  
 In the earlier period Pakeha rates of infant and childhood survivorship 
improved dramatically between the 1870s and the early 1900s. In the cohort 
of 1871-76, 82 per cent of boys would reach age 10; by 1891-96, this had 
jumped to 88 per cent, but by 1911-16, this had climbed more gradually to 
91per cent. For girls the comparable cohort figures were 84 per cent, 89 per 
cent and 93 per cent.  Age 10 is the crucial age to which to survive – the 
chances then of reaching age 50, even in a higher mortality population such 
as Pakeha were in the early 20th century, are reasonably high. 
 A feature of life-tables is that they capture the effects of differentials in 
the force of mortality across the life cycle. Even in higher mortality 
populations the force is concentrated at young and old ages, with much les 
impact between childhood and the late middle ages. As mortality declines, 
the force shifts to older ages. Even in high mortality populations a small 
minority reach old age and go on to very old age – the secret is getting to , 
say, 65 years. For Maori cohorts born at the end of the 19th century 25 per 
cent would have died before their first birthday; 50 per cent before the end 
of childhood; obviously very few were left to get to age 65 years. The very 
small minority who did might have included among them the odd person 
who reach the “oldest of the old ages” – we know one of them, Dame Whina 
Cooper. If we go to the opposite extreme 90 per cent of Pakeha born in 2001 
can expect to reach retirement ages. 
 The rapid decline in the in the force of mortality at younger ages among 
Pakeha cohorts in the late 19th century gathered a momentum that pushed 
more and more people not only across into adulthood, but also to survive to 
reach 50 years of age. This is shown in Table 2 which relates to the 
probabilities of survival for cohorts across wider age ranges – from birth to 
age 10 years; from 10 to age 50.  Gains in survival to age 10 had been 
through there most rapid period of change by 1896 and then slowed 
thereafter. The effects of gains at childhood then flowed into older ages. 
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This was because cohorts with more favourable experiences in terms of 
exposure to risk factors, and to mortality and morbidity were reaching older 
life-cycle stages. The underlined values show the shifts in relative force 
between life-cycle phases. 
 
Table 2: Inter-cohort differences (absolute) in survivorship at 
childhood (0-9 years) (10p0) and between ages 10 and 50 
years (40p10), Pakeha cohorts 1871-76 to 1931-36 
 
Males Females Difference between 
the cohorts of 
10p0 40p10 10p0 40p10 
(1891-96) - (1871-76) 0.05871 0.03845 0.05374 0.04352 
(1911-16) - (1891-96) 0.03471 0.04624 0.03326 0.05286 
(1931-36) -  (1911-16)   0.03968 0.02039 0.03159 0.02525 
 
Note:  greatest change per cohort underlined. There are differences in the two 
spans – 10 years for 10p0 and 40 years for 40p10. 
 
 This table shows that there was another factor starting to appear. The 
differences between the cohort of 1911-16 and that of 1931-36 had dropped 
off by comparison with those ahead of them, especially at ages 10 to 50 
years. This signals the onset of cohort deterioration to which I will now 
turn my attention. In passing, one of the bitternesses my cohort can carry 
into old age is that we were one of the first Pakeha cohorts to suffer 
deterioration, and ours was one of the worst. This cohort of overfed Plunket 
babies suffered relatively higher levels of ill-health when we became adults. 
 Cohort deterioration occurs when the survivorship of a given cohort at 
any life-cycle phase is lower than that of its predecessor. From the Pakeha 
birth cohorts of the 1920s   this was evident across a wide range of adult 
ages, particularly for males. Explanations for deterioration revolve around 
two alternative postulates. It could have been due to the effects of improved 
regimes of maternal and infant care introduced in the inter-war decades of 
the 20th century, regimes that permitted high-risk babies to survive to 
become “frail” adults; or it could have been the lifestyles adopted by the 
same cohorts later in life – in this case we are talking about the behaviours 
and environments in the 1950s and 1960s to which were exposed cohorts 
born in the interwar years. 
 Coming forward to the 1990s, a cohort view throws into question cross-
sectional analyses relating to Maori health. The arguments by Blakely and 
his colleagues in their highly publicized work on the theme of decades of 
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disparities, is that the economic and social climate of the late 1980s and 
1990s was such that it had direct impact on Maori-Pakeha health 
differentials. Our data do not lead us to reject outright this view, but instead 
to argue that it is simplistic. Before we hear the standard explanation, that it 
will all be due to ethnic definitional problems, I must add one further 
qualification: as Jit Cheung and I point out the deterioration was not due to 
changes in ethnic reporting such as a postulated over-enumeration of Maori 
in 1996, which, if it were true, would see denominators inflated and death 
rates reduced, rather the contrary to what we found. To add to problems 
there is the strong possibility that in the early 1990s Pacific Island deaths 
were misreported as Maori. If anything our results veer towards being 
overly conservative. 
 Cohort analyses show that deterioration set in as early as 1981 for some 
cohorts, and occurred systematically across cohorts at adult ages over the 
early 1990s. If Pacific Island deaths that had previously been recorded as 
Maori were being more carefully assigned by the end of the decade, then 
Maori survivorship around 1991 would have been higher than is often 
argued, and levels of survivorship in 2001 would have been lower than they 
had been in 1991. In short, there was deterioration through the decade, but a 
pattern foreshadowed by deterioration much earlier. We concluded “That 
the deterioration in 1991-96 was a residual effect of a long history of cycles 
of cohort gain and deterioration reinforced by period effects coming from 
restructuring” (Pool and Cheung 2003:123). The period effects cited by 
Blakely et al. had an impact on what was already a bio-medically vulnerable 
population with health needs often determined by experiences sustained 
many years before when these cohorts were at childhood ages.  
 The cohort approach that recognizes momentum effects makes a 
nonsense of the Wellington policy/political orthodoxy that would wish 
away ethnic differences in health and other factors. Socio-economic 
differences are very important, make no mistake, but each ethnic group also 
has a totally different cohort history and no amount of spurious policy 
analysis can eliminate the differential burden of risk that ethnic cohorts 
carry with them. Just take one fact: Maori women at older ages (any one 
childbearing before about 1975) will have had on average twice the number 
of children of their Pakeha peers, and thus, assuming that the physiological 
burden of childbearing is spread equally by parity, and that Maori women 
on average had access to exactly the same quality of gynaecological care as 
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their Pakeha peers, then the health risks associated with this, including 
diabetes, will be twice as high. Of course the reality is that their risks will 
have been greater. 
 
Momentum Coming from Fertility Timing Changes 
 
When a shift upwards in fertility by age occurs, there is often a hiatus as 
those who normally would have had their babies at young ages postpone 
them. This will be followed by a flush of births as women who were 
postponing their births then decide to have them. This was exactly the 
mechanism that produced the Baby Blip, a phenomenon we normally 
associate with Pakeha.  
 
Table 3:  Maori Age-Specific Fertility Rates (per 1000 women), 1991 
and 2002 
 
Age group   1991  2002  Difference 
Less than 20 years      74       63   -  11 
20-24 years     141     140   -    1 
25-29 years     118     128   + 10 
30-34 years       70       98   + 28 
35-39 years       30       49   + 19 
40-44 years         7        13   +   6 
 
 
 In contrast, for Maori the force of fertility has notably been towards 
younger ages.  Yet if a longer perspective is taken, between 1991 and 2001, 
a gradual shift is seen to be taking place, as is shown in Table 3. These data 
suggest that Maori may be embarking on a new phase in their family 
transition, the first being the radical decline in family sizes in the 1970s, and 
the present one a move upwards in the patterns of family building. The net 
result of this shift-share amounts to an increase in fertility, the equivalent of 
0.25 live births per woman. This is, in fact, most of the difference between 
the TFRs of 1991 (2.19) and those of 2002 (2.47). The question arises, then, 
whether the increases in Maori fertility in the late 1990s, normally 
attributed to definitional changes, were not due in part, or even instead, to 
changes in the rhythm of Maori childbearing, and the momentum this has 
introduced.  
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 The year 1991 saw the ending of the old pattern of very early 
childbearing, which came about by very rapid decreases in fertility at older 
maternal ages, a typical stage in a rapid fertility transition (see Pool 1991). 
Let us not forget that Maori went through a very rapid Baby Bust in the 
1970s and 1980s. In contrast, by 2001 the onset of the new pattern had 
occurred. If the growth in the TFR had been purely through definitional 
change, as is frequently argued, then we would not have seen such a 




Cross-sectional analyses often produce misleading results. This is 
particularly true of demography which by its nature is a diachronic science, 
not a synchronic one. We are interested in changes over time, and thus 
varying period effects. But we are a life science also interested in changes 
over the life cycle. And we are interested in the intersection of these. 
 As individuals carry their earlier experiences with them, so too do 
generations. This produces an impetus in the behaviour of cohorts, an 
impetus we call momentum. Often in fact this momentum will be driven by 
inexorable forces. 
 I have shown here through case studies that momentum effects are very 
real, and that by ensuring that they are taken into consideration a much 
more valid picture can be gained of demographic patterns and trends. My 
argument is that we must put the analysis of momentum into all serious 
demographic research – synchronic analyses may suffice for the “lesser 
breeds” of disciplines, but not for one that traces its genesis to the very 
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